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ISSN 1109-6691 Editorial 
  The South-Eastern European Monetary History Network (SEEMHN) is a 
community of financial historians, economists and statisticians, established in April 
2006 at the initiation of the Bulgarian National Bank and the Bank of Greece. Its 
objective is to spread knowledge on the economic history of the region in the context 
of European experience with a specific focus on financial, monetary and banking 
history. The First and the Second Annual Conferences were held in Sofia (BNB) in 
2006 and in Vienna (OeNB) in 2007. Additionally, the SEEMHN Data Collection 
Task Force aims at establishing a historical data base with 19
th and 20
th century 
financial and monetary data for countries in the region. A set of data has already been 
published as an annex to the 2007 conference proceedings, released by the OeNB 
(2008, Workshops, no 13). 
On 13-14 March 2008, the Third Annual Conference was held in Athens, 
hosted by the Bank of Greece. The conference was dedicated to Banking and Finance 
in South-Eastern Europe: Lessons of Historical Experience. It was attended by 
representatives of the Albanian, Austrian, Belgian, Bulgarian, German, Greek, 
Romanian, Russian, Serbian and Turkish central banks, as well as participants from a 
number of universities and research institutions. Professor Michael Bordo delivered 
the key note speech on Growing up to Financial Stability. The participants presented, 
reviewed and assessed the experience of SE Europe with financial development, 
banking and central banking from a comparative and historical perspective. 
The 4
th Annual SEEMHN Conference will be hosted by the National Serbian 
Bank on 27
th March 2009 in Belgrade. The topic of the Conference will be Economic 
and Financial Stability in SE Europe in a Historical and Comparative Perspective. 
  The papers presented at the 2008 SEEMHN Conference are being made 
available to a wider audience in the Working Paper Series of the Bank of Greece. 
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The economic narratives of Southeast Europe during the first part of the 20
th century 
are currently being re-written. A story of failed industrialisation and delayed 
modernisation during the Interwar period has dominated since the pioneering work of 
Gerschenkron, but not enough aggregate data are available to see this as the only 
interpretation. In particular, virtually nothing is known about the financial system.  
This paper has two aims. First, it looks at the banking sector in Bulgaria in 1924-
1938. We provide new data for the 1920s rise and the 1930s decline of the Bulgarian 
banking sector and we evaluate its potential contribution to Bulgarian economic 
growth. In the second part, we discuss different explanations for the widespread 
collapse of commercial banks after the onset of the Great Depression. Relying on a 
new data set for over 100 Bulgarian commercial banks, we show that traditional 
explanations for the collapse of European commercial banks in the 1930s (based on 
the default of risky loans and falling asset prices due to deflation) need to be 
complemented by the pernicious effects of widespread insider lending in the 
Bulgarian case. We conclude that insider lending was the single most important factor 
behind the demise of the private banking system after the onset of the Depression.  
 
Keywords: Bulgarian economic development; Banking and finance; Great 
Depression; Insider lending. 
JEL classification:  E44; G21; G14; N24. 
 
 
Acknowledgements: the author is grateful to Matthias Morys (Economic Department, 
University of Oxford) for his exceptional support. Martin Ivanov (BAS), Nikolay 
Nenovsky (BNB), Roumen Avramov (CLS), Avner Offer, Knick Harley, Jane 
Humphries and David Chambers (all from the University of Oxford) provided me 
with invaluable comments. An internship at the Bulgarian National Bank and work 
with Nikolay Nenovsky and Kalina Dimitrova (BNB) has given me the time and 
resources to work at the archives for much longer than I could have hoped for 
otherwise. I am grateful to the Economic and Social Research Council in the UK and 
the George Webb Medley Fund at the Economics Department of Oxford University 




Nuffield College, Oxford, OX1 1NF, UK;  
Email: Kiril.kossev@nuffield.oxac.u  7
1. Introduction 
In a recent paper, Ivanov and Tooze (2007) have pointed out the lack of 
consistent narratives about the economic development of South-East Europe pre-
1945
1. While they have put forward this agenda to the attention of economists and 
economic historians, and have laid some of the groundwork, work on the aggregate is 
still incomplete. Quantitative analysis of the factors contributing to growth in the 
regions is yet to come. The stylised facts of stagnating agriculture, failed 
industrialisation and buoyant, yet inefficient financial sector, have to be placed in 
appropriate quantitative framework.  
The divergent views on the economic development of the Southeast European 
region range from the overly optimistic paper of Good and Ma (1999), through to the 
extreme pessimism of Palairet (2001)
2. The former view, backed by Maddison in his 
cross-country GDP estimates, suggests slow convergence of the European periphery 
to the core. Palairet’s work stops in 1914 and presents a bleak picture of stagnation 
and decline, especially in the predominant agricultural sector. The rather outdated 
Bulgarian Economy by John Lampe and the economic survey of the Balkan countries 
during the last century by Lampe and Jackson are rather more moderate
3.  
Two modern works by Avramov and Daskalov follow the conclusions of 
Alexander Gerschenkron about a failed attempt at modernisation and industrialisation 
during the Interwar period
4. Without doubt, the work of Gerschenkron stands out as a 
pioneering attempt at using aggregate data, yet it is, as Gerschenkron himself 
suggested, ‘unsystematic and of narrow scope’
5. Bulgarian scholars writing in the 
communist period have adhered to a descriptive tradition presenting a steady decline 
until 1945, which ignores the obvious dynamics of a developing economy. The works 
of Berov have become classics now
6. They are, however, heavily laden with extreme 
ideological material and provide little in the way of analysis.  
Contemporaries of the interwar period, on the other hand, have written 
numerous and provoking accounts of the country’s financial system.  Iconic figures 
                                                 
1 Ivanov and Tooze (2007). 
2 Good and Ma (1999) and Palairet (2001). 
3 Lampe (1986) and  Lampe and Jackson (1988). 
4 Avramov (2007), Daskalov (2005) and Gerschenkron (1962). 
5 Gerschenkron (1962, p. 198). 
6  Berov (1989).  8
like Stoyan Bochev, a long-term banker and influential figure in the economic circles 
of interwar Bulgaria was a prolific writer. Christoforov – a popular economic scholar, 
and Tchakalov – director of research at the Bulgarian National Bank, both made 
valuable contributions
7. These, together with an aggregate quantitative analysis can 
help further our insights into the dynamics of finance in the Interwar Period.  
As far as the role of finance and the banking sector in the development of the 
Bulgarian economy is concerned – there is very little in the way of modern scholarly 
research. Avramov (2007) has provided some invaluable insights through case 
studies. The first aim of this paper is to provide an overview of Bulgarian Interwar 
finance and make suggestions about its possible influences on economic growth. We 
provide new data for the 1920s rise and the 1930s decline of the Bulgarian banking 
sector and we evaluate its potential contribution to Bulgarian economic growth. The 
data is constructed from a previously unused archive of an institution crated in 1931, 
the Bank Board, complementary to the Bulgarian National Bank and the Ministry of 
Finance, to oversee the commercial banking sector and account for the widespread 
insolvencies
8. This new source is a unique opportunity to gain a fresh glimpse at the 
workings of the financial system during Interwar Bulgaria. A central problem that 
emerges from the data is the high levels of insider lending. Our hypothesis is therefore 
that this factor may explain the widespread bank failures of the 1930s.  
Insider lending was by no means unique for Interwar Bulgaria. A great deal of 
economic literature deals with the positive effects of finance on economic 
development. Levine (1993) provides an excellent survey of the theoretical 
underpinnings and the empirical tests that have been conducted. More recently, Trew 
(2006) has summarised the findings of the literature on the finance-growth nexus. One 
branch of that literature deals with the suggestion that the structural specifics of 
national financial system can have profound effects on the development of these 
nations
9. In particular – universal banking and relationship banking – have been at the 
core of a debate regarding the benefits of long-term links between banks and 
industry
10. Lamoreux (1994) has discussed the practice of insider lending, associated 
with universal banking and has concluded positively regarding this phenomenon using 
                                                 
7Bochev (1926), Christoforov (1946) and Tchakalov (1946). 
8 Bankersky Suvet (translated to Bank Board by League of Nations 1934 publication on Commercial 
Banks). 
9 Cameron (1967) and more recently see, Forsyth and Verdier (2003).  
10 Cameron (1967) and Fohlin (2007).  9
19
th century east-coast US banks. More recent analysis of insider lending has moved 
away from praise to the other extreme. La Porta et al has blamed this practice for the 
severity of the mid-1990s banking crisis in Mexico
11. Chapter 4 will discuss the views 
of the economic literature on the subject. It will also suggest the theoretical 
underpinnings of the paper suggested by this literature.  
This paper argues that persistent credit constraints led to banks-industry 
interlocking and prevalence of insider loans and these set up a trap for 
underdeveloped industry during the deflation. Using unique archive material, we are 
able to test the suggestion that insider lending was one of the main causes for the 
sweeping bank failures during the depression. The conclusion is that interlocking – 
presented as a solution to a moral hazard problem – exemplified the negative 
consequences of underdeveloped financial markets in a time of economic crisis. The 
power of personal relations is linked to central problems in economics – agency 
theory and models of principal-agent incentives. Empirical evidence of the impact of 
such activities can further the finance-growth nexus and help bring these problems to 
the forefront of policy-making. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the second section, we 
will discuss the literature on Bulgarian interwar economic history. Recent research 
might have improved our knowledge of the real economy, but very little is known 
about the financial sector. We will fill this gap, partly at least, in the third chapter by 
providing the reader with new data showing the rise of the Bulgarian banking system 
in the 1920s and its dramatic decline after the onset of the Great Depression. We then 
turn to the second aim of this paper, i.e. explaining the dramatic decline of the 
banking system in the 1930s. In section four, we will set the stage by discussing what 
we know about bank failures in other European countries in the 1930s. We will also 
provide some theoretical guidance to the problem of interlocking. The fifth section is 
the centrepiece of this paper in which we show econometrically that widespread 
insider lending was the single most important factor behind the demise of the private 
banking system after the onset of the Depression. The final part concludes. 
 
                                                 
11 La Porta et al (2002).   10
2. Bulgarian Economic History Literature on the Interwar Period 
  Ivanov and Tooze (2007) suggest that there are three strands to the debate 
about East and Southeast European growth experience since the late 19
th century. 
Those who write in the spirit of the late 19
th century globalisation, like to see 
convergence to the European core, albeit in very moderate terms. Revisionists like 
Michael Palairet, on the contrary, detect divergence, falls in productivity and 
digression from a market to a subsistence agricultural economy.  The reason for such 
divergent views is the lack of consistent quantitative evidence, which can establish the 
growth rates of the economy on the aggregate but also the different strands of 
industry, agriculture and services. Ivanov and Tooze who start off on that path, using 
data for Bulgaria, have pointed to some important conclusions already, which suggest 
a middle ground for thinking about the economic development of that country. We 
have no intention of suggesting a consensus amongst the growth narratives and it is 
not our aim to present a new take on the data available regarding industrial or 
agricultural performance either. Rather we aim to persuade in this first section that 
more work is needed to find a consistent and convincing narrative about economic 
development and especially accentuate on the lack of work and data on the aggregate 
for one very important sector – banking and finance.  
  John Lampe’s book on the Bulgarian economy is still the only book-length 
account in English that attempts to present an aggregate view of the 20
th century 
development of that country
12. Thus it is necessarily the benchmark against, which all 
other analyses are presented. Partially using data from the earlier work by Bairoch, it 
provides a sterling case for the optimistic view of convergence
13. Including the years 
of the two world wars, Lampe’s figure of 2.7% growth, nearly double the European 
average of 1.7%
14. Thus the optimistic case has been more or less influenced by the 
stylised fact of economic catch-up on part of the less developed periphery suggested 
by neo-classical growth theory. Good and Ma (1999) have framed their quantitative 
analysis in such lines. They conclude that the potential growth, consistent with catch-
up on the developed core was only achieved in the late 19
th century up until 1914. 
During the Interwar period and subsequent communist regime there was very little 
                                                 
12 Lampe (1986).  
13 Bairoch (1976), pp.273-340. 
14 Lampe (1986) p.14.  11
economic advancement. They, therefore present a middle ground amongst growth 
historians of the Balkan region. 
  Ivanov and Tooze have re-estimated the national income of Bulgaria for 1892 
and 1911, whilst adding new data points 1899, 1905 and 1921. The difficulties of 
gathering new data have meant that they can not present an unbroken sequence of 
figures, but from the estimates they provide, a number of conclusions can be drown. 
Prior to 1914 no significant progress was achieved, yet they claim that the Interwar 
period was notable for the changes that took place within the agrarian sector in the 
economy – like switching to production of industrial crops. Still figures for industrial 
share of output were around 15%, which is little changed from earlier parts of the 20
th 
century. The literature on Bulgaria presents a predominantly agricultural economy, 
where the share of the agrarian sector amounted to 70%-80% throughout the late 19
th 
and early 20
th centuries. This evidence seems to confirm Palairet’s phrase – evolution 
without development.  
The latter has provided a rather bleak picture of the Balkan economies pre-
1914
15. His arguments suggest that the break with the Ottoman Empire resulted in 
restricted domestic markets, redistribution of land into small landholding and gradual 
retreat from the market and a return to subsistence farming on the part of the peasant 
populations. This resulted in the divergence from the European core rather than 
growth in development.  
Bulgarian historians have taken a similar stance. Two recent works by 
Daskalov and Avramov have largely agreed with the pessimistic narrative
16. They 
very much agree to a story presented by Gerschenkron in 1950s- amounting to failed 
modernisation and industrialisation. Daskalov claims that the only sectors outside 
agriculture, which exhibited some growth, were the state protected industries – 
mining, metal works, electricity production, chemical products, etc. Figures he 
borrows from contemporary writers show fourfold increase in the number of 
enterprises, which received state support, and around threefold increase in the number 
of workers employed there between the years of 1909-1939
17. He gives us a feel for 
                                                 
15 Palairet, (2001). 
16 Avramov (2007) and Daskalov (2005). 
17 Daskalov (2003), p. 323.  12
the stagnation in other sectors by putting forward a number of examples to act as case 
studies. Avramov (2007) uses a similar approach to present not dissimilar results.  
The work of Ivanov and Tooze has boosted the case of the pessimists. Given 
the painstaking efforts to gather data for the period pre-1924 and match that across 
other available estimates, it seems that the case of divergence, suggested by Palairet, 
is more believable than the overly optimistic picture, painted by Lampe and Lampe & 
Jackson. Further inconsistency is the evolution of the agrarian sector between the 
world wars. Ivanov and Tooze’s data suggests a move towards industrial crops, 
decline in grain production and shifting the balance of exports to tobacco
18. Lampe’s 
figures, taken from the Statistical Yearbook of Bulgaria, suggest growth in grain and 
tobacco production, but a decline in industrial crops
19. A conclusion that follows is 
that agriculture did not stay stagnant – there were clear efforts to overcome the world-
wide decline in the prices of primary products and the increasing trade isolation, faced 
by the agricultural producers in the periphery during and after the Depression.  
If aggregate data about the real economy is sparse and difficult to put together, 
then data on the financial sector is even more so. All of Lampe, Avramov and 
Daskalov talk about expansion in the banking sector during the 1920s and then a 
severe contraction during the 1930s. The second part of the Interwar period was also 
allegedly characterised by an increased role of state capital, a centralisation of private 
bank capital into fewer, but larger institutions and a near complete flight of foreign 
capitals from the country. This very much represented a return to the pre-1919 state of 
the economy, as Avramov (2007) has suggested. Lampe has provided some data on 
loan value of banks during the 1920s to illustrate the much-increased share of private 
commercial banks. He suggests a near doubling in the value of loans given out by 
private commercial institutions from 1911 to 1928
20. Avramov has used case studies 
to illustrate the dynamics of the microcosm of the financial world. His conclusions of 
the overbearing role of the state and foreign capital in the Bulgarian financial system 
and the chronic shortage of capital will form the starting premise of the next chapter. 
He has also provided some very good examples of insider lending with fatal 
                                                 
18 Ivanov and Tooze, p. 25 
19 Lampe (1986), p. 85. Lampe suggests largest growth in vegetable output between 1931-1935, by 
around 29%. For the same period yield per hectare in industrial crop fell by 29%, but due to increased 
land in cultivation, actual output per capital increased by 12%. Grain output per capital increased by 
9%, but yield/h went up by some 14%.  
20Ibid., p. 67  13
consequences for the banks
21. We very much agree with his conclusion of widespread 
practice of insider lending, which rotted the banking system from inside – we provide 
quantitative evidence on the aggregate for this and a formal test in chapter 6. We also 
feel there is a need for a narrative on the aggregate level, about the experience of the 
banking sector. The following section takes steps towards that aim.  
 
3. Banking Structure and Finance in the Bulgarian Economy, 1924-
1936 
Given the uncertainties in quantitative terms about the economic experience of 
the Southeast European region and Bulgaria in particular during the Interwar Period – 
the majority of scholars have followed the general trend of explaining the 1920s as 
years of dynamic growth, which descended into slowdown and a lengthy depression.  
The 1930s were then the time of slow recovery, but also increasing international 
isolation
22.  
Fall in prices of primary products undermined significant parts of the 
peripheral countries’ income.  As export income dried up, reparation and foreign debt 
payments became extremely difficult. By 1931 countries like Poland, Romania, 
Yugoslavia and Bulgaria were in an untenable indebtedness
23. Policies used to 
alleviate the crisis involved rigorous exchange controls and increased state 
intervention into the industrial and financial sector. These had significant deflationary 
effects on enterprises and a knock on effect on the financial and credit facilities.   
Figure 1, below, shows the movement of GDP for a selection of Balkan countries and 
Austria, as a central European benchmark. Figure 2 shows the movements of 







                                                 
21 Avramov (2007), vol. 2, pp. 405-455. 
22 Lampe, (1986), p. 78  
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For the majority of the countries in South-East Europe the Depression meant a 
long and difficult period of economic stagnation, which lasted until the end of World 
War II.  Figure 1 suggests that exceptions were Greece and Bulgaria. Given the acute 
awareness of contemporaries of the economic depression the figures presented above 
are puzzling. An interpretation regarding Bulgaria, involve the invigorating injection 
of foreign capital through two major loans – the Refugee Settlement Loan in 1926 and 
the Stabilisation Loan of 1928
24.  There is a danger of overstatement, as experience 
                                                 
24 Pasvolsky  (1930), pp. 109-110 
Source: Tchakalov, 1946  15
from the developing countries tends to show that such loans are usually recycled 
through the state bureaucracies and hardly ever reach the credit system or the 
industrial base of the country in question
25. More work is needed to disentangle the 
picture resented to us by GDP estimates. The nominal values of figure 2 are more 
representative of the depression period – as the real values, corrected for inflation, 
necessarily present the deflation years 1929-1933 as a period of stability.  
Figure 3 presents a price index of Bulgaria that we have constructed using 
similar data to Lampe and Jackson, with 1927 as a base year. There, the sharp fall 
during the turn of the decade is evident.  Figure 4 presents a breakdown of the price 
fall into the prices of manufactured and agricultural goods. 
Figure 3: 
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25 Dadush and Nielson, (2007), for a most recent view on the inefficiency of international loans and aid, 
see, Easterling, The White Man’s Burden (2007).     16
Unambiguous and sharp fall in prices began in the late 1920s. Somewhat 
surprisingly our index shows a steady recovery from 1933 onwards, while Berov’s 
data reaches a bottom around the same time and remains there.  
Agricultural production, in terms of total crops output, shrunk by 18%
26. The 
industrial sector shrank by about 34%, but its recovery was much more rapid in 
comparison to the agricultural sector
27. Overall the Bulgarian economy seems to have 
reached a nadir in terms of output around 1934. The data presented above, however, 
fully reflects the controversies of the scholarly literature. It opens more questions than 
the answers it can provide.   
Most of our original data comes from previously unused archive materials, to 
be found in the Central Archive in Bulgaria. Very useful additions were publications 
by contemporaries as well as League of Nations reports on the commercial banking 
systems
28. The latter provide a useful crosscheck since the financial data is presented 
in the format of an orderly balance sheet.  
The database used in the quantitative analysis of this paper has been collected 
from the archive of an institution called Bankerski Suvet (Banking Committee, BC 
thereafter), created within the Ministry of Finance, now preserved within the Central 
State Archive of Bulgaria, in Sofia
29.  This institution was set up on 4
th January 1931, 
with the Act for the Protection of Private Deposits
30.  Its functions were to act as a 
regulator to the banking sector, demand standardized balance sheets and reports from 
each bank and review any misconduct of banking institutions.  Its members were 
central bankers from the Bulgarian National Bank (BNB) and experienced auditors 
working for the BNB as well as the Ministry of Finance, in additional to 






                                                 
26 Pasvolski, p. 438. 
27 Tchakalov (1946), p. 114; see also Avramov( 2007), p.64. 
28 League of Nations Memorandum on Commercial Banks, Geneva (1934). 
29 Central State Archive, file 602k, 1.  
30 Durjaven Vestnik [State Newspaper], v. 227 from 12/1/1931.  17
Picture 1:  





The early 1930s saw a series of legislative acts, caused by the anxiety of 
consecutive bank failures and serious increase in the indebtedness of the population. 
By 1932, three laws were passed to protect banks having problems of liquidity, 
debtors as well as debtors involved in small-scale agriculture
31. These pieces of 
legislation were instrumental in establishing set rules for financial accountability.  
Importantly, once a bank was in difficulties with the payment of its reserve 
deposit with the BNB or following complaints by customers for delayed payment of 
their deposits, the BC was obliged to send an external auditor whose job was to 
examine thoroughly the accounts and report on the bank situation. It is these reports 
that turned out to be most useful for the current research, because they contain end-of-
year balance sheets and, more often than not, a list of main debtors as well as main 
depositors, list of the members of the governing council of each bank, and analysis of 
the external auditor as to the nature of the bank difficulties and the possible reasons. 
Within the archived documents of the BC there were 101 folders for each bank 
registered with the BC and allowed legally to practice banking. These contained 
reasonably detailed quantitative information, as well as qualitative reports and 
opinions by the external auditor
32. 
Most of the quantitative data was extracted from the balance sheets of banks, 
but gathering the data on interlocking presented some problems of methodological 
                                                 
31 ibid., pp.216-217; the laws are Zakon za Predpaznia Konkordat, Zakon za Oblekchenie na Dlujnicite 
and Zakon za Zakrila na Zemedeleca Stopanin.  
32 For a list of all archival folders, see section on primary sources in the Bibliography.   18
nature. I have followed standard legal practice, outlined in La Porta et al, and have 
defined related debtors as those who are: (1) shareholder, director or officers of the 
banks; (2) family members of shareholders, directors or officers of the bank; (3) firms 
where the previous two categories of individuals are officers or directors; or (4) firms 
where the bank itself owns shares
33. This information was extracted from the auditors 
control report, where the auditors themselves have on a number of occasions branded 
debtors as insiders. This procedure is imperfect and it is possible that a certain volume 
of insider loans were not recorded. The bias however is more likely to act in support 
of our conclusions, because it likely that, if anything, we have underestimated the 
total volume of insider loans.  
What follows is a schematic outline of the findings in aggregate terms of the 
structure of the banking sector in interwar Bulgaria as well as its experience during 
the Great Depression.  
The financial system of Bulgaria began its development immediately after the 
country gained in dependence – in 1880 the lev was adopted as a national currency, 
while the pillar of the banking system, the Bulgarian National Bank, was set up in 
1879.  By 1885 the BNB had full issuing rights and was involved in the provision of 
credit to customers.  BNB’s role of a creditor should have legally ended in 1928, but it 
retained a sizeable 10% of the direct credit for some time after that
34. The state gave 
the initial impetus of the credit sector – within a period of 30 years, 1879-1910, the 
BNB, the Bulgarska Zemedelska Banka (BZB) and Bulgarska Centralna 
Kooperativna Banka (BCKB) were created
35.  
A complex substructure formed below these large institutions – agricultural 
credit cooperatives operated in the countryside, being fed on the funds of the BZB, 
and a town and city equivalent, called popular banks, formed to provide loans to crafts 
and industrial cooperatives.  The relationship was not entirely unidirectional – 
sometimes the BZB and BCKB sidestepped the smaller intermediaries and lent 
directly to the final consumer.   
The private banking sector presents a simpler picture. Private finance was 
organized around the representatives of a few foreign banks, which entered the credit 
                                                 
33 La Porta et al (2002), p. 8. 
34 Annual Reports of the BNB, 1880-1929. 
35 Avramov, (2007), vol. 2, p. 72.  19
market in Bulgaria in the 1900s
36. In 1903 there was a reform in the commercial 
legislation, which allowed foreign residents to sit in the controlling committees of 
joint stock companies
37. This significantly boosted the chances of foreign presence 
and there was real influx of foreign banks and capital after 1919. A total of 13 large 
foreign banks accounted for some 40% of the private bank capital of Bulgaria by 
1929
38.   
A number of large independent financial institutions was formed, mainly in 
the capital city of Sofia, however after 1919, the difference between these and the 
foreign banks became very slight – foreign capital leaked through to the significant 
banks based in Sofia. At the bottom, in terms of size according to assets and credits 
were the small shareholding banks, which operated mainly outside Sofia. These were 
the institutions, which had to break through the credit constraints faced by 
industrialists, agricultural workers and craftsmen, who were not large or well-
organized enough to obtain access to the big foreign banks. These were also the 
institutions hit worst by the deflation and the prolonged depression – so many of them 
collapsed that by 1935, a Banka Bulgarski Kredit (BBC) was formed to gather the 
remnants into one large institution. Although legally private, it was de facto controlled 
by the state and its capital was mainly supplied by funds from the BNB reserves. 
Figure 5, below, shows the assets of private banks in levs, classified according to the 
above discussion, in 1928, just before the onset of the depression.  
Figure 5: 
 


























Source: CDA f.252k, op.1
 
 
                                                 
36 The first foreign bank to enter the Bulgarian credit market was Deutschebank, through the 
establishment of Credit Bank in 1906 in Sofia.  
37 Crampton (2007), p. 304. 
38 Lampe (1986), p. 66.  20
Private banks, located in Sofia, were by far the largest in terms of asset 
volume. Banks with foreign capital were larger as a group that the total of all small 
private banks in Bulgaria
39. It is important to point out that although the figure above 
suggests provincial private banks possessed smallest volume of assets, they were very 
important for local agricultural producers, merchants and craftsmen.  
 Figure 6 compares the asset shares of the three state owned banks versus the 
private banks (the latter include all private institutions – from large foreign banks to 
small provincial banks). It is evident that state capital was a pillar in the financial 
system. BZB, the Agricultural Bank, in particular, possessed as much as half of the 
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39 ‘Small’ is classified as a bank with less than 30,000 leva as total assets.   21
Figure 7 provides further evidence for the structure of the banking sector in 
the 1920s. It presents the aggregate assets shares of state banks, cooperative banks 
(intermediaries between the BCKB and BZB and the final consumer), and private 
banks.  The total share of assets of the private banks is larger than each of the shares 
of state or cooperative banks and just over half of the total assets. Given the small 
number of state institutions – three- each of them is more significant than any of the 
private banks on its own. More data, providing a further breakdown of the banking 














































































Source: Statistical Yearbook of Kingdom Bulgaria 






Credit Institutions According to Capital 

























Source: Statistical Yearbook of Kingdom Bulgaria 
vols. XIV-XXVIII, 1923-1936  
  22
Figures 8 and 9 show an overall picture of the credit system in Interwar 
Bulgaria. The early 1920s, years of hyperinflation and currency instability brought 
very slow development. Sharp increase in the number of institutions and amount of 
credit can be seen in 1928-1929 and then a steady contraction throughout the 1930s. 
The private commercial banks saw the most dramatic changes in their portfolios. 
During the second half of the 1920s deposits held in them increased by about 100%, 
while only for the period 1929-1932 they declined by about 50%
40. In this respect, the 
Bulgaria banking sector did not have a unique experience – the irrational exuberance 
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40 Author’s own data. See, tables 2,3 and 4 in the Appendix.   23
During the Depression years, significantly, the role of foreign capital 
diminished radically – from 20% of total active capital in 1931, to below 7% in 1934.  
In absolute terms the short-term foreign credits fell from 2,500 mln. levs in 1929 to 
812 mln. in 1931 and 210 mln. in 1934
41.  This had a severe deflationary effect and 
led to a radical restructuring of the banking system. The private sector was supposed 
to fill the gap, and indeed, by 1936 the two largest private institutions had more 
deposits than the four foreign banks still present in the Bulgarian credit market after 
the depression, but also twice as much as all the small private banks together
42.  This 
suggests an interesting dynamic – expectedly, the largest institutions were best placed 
to survive the depression and retained their assets and increased their market share, in 
light of the distress of small private institutions of local importance.  So many of the 
latter experiences severe difficulties of liquidity, that by 1934, a state intervention was 
necessary to restructure the feeble private sector.  The choice of banks facing ruin was 
either to merge into the de facto state bank BBC or to be liquidating, if they had lost 
more than 50% of their operational capital. Figures 8 and 9 illustrate the results of the 
liquidity shock that the depression caused. The former presents the rise in the number 
of credit institutions during the euphoria of the late 1920s, after the Stabilization and 
Refugee loans injected liquidity into the credit system, but also the subsequent fall, 
caused by bankruptcy and merger, in the early 1930s. The latter graph illustrates the 
same situation, but in terms of capital. There, the drop seems less significant, but has 
to be kept in mind, that bank liquidation was a very slow process, sometimes taking 
the whole of the 1930s decade, due to prolonged law suits to recover bad loans.   
Furthermore, many of the banks, which merged into BBC still counted a substantial 
part of their capital as recoverable, while in fact it was either acutely diminished or 
totally lost, due to the deflation and bankruptcy of their debtors. Figures 10 and 11 
illustrate a further interesting dynamic, where the state sector took over a large part of 
the decline of the private sector. This is illustrated in terms of share of deposits and 
share of loans respectively.  
Tables 1 and 2 below, present the changes in commercial bank deposits just 
before and during the depression in an international context. We can see that Bulgaria 
experiences a healthy increase in deposits of commercial banks during the 1920s, but 
                                                 
41 Christoforov (1946), p. 179.  
42 Avramov (2007), vol. 2, p. 411.  24
by 1932 a sharp decline can be detected – Bulgaria was amongst the countries, the 




Table 1: Movements of Commercial Bank Deposits, 
1925-1929 
Source: League of Nations, Geneva 1934 









Poland  Germany  Mexico  Yugoslavia  Sweden 
Hungary  Belgium  Switzerland  Czechoslovakia  India 
Latvia  Romania  Venezuela  Canada  Denmark 
Estonia  Lithuania  Finland  Argentine  Bolivia 
Colombia  Bulgaria  Austria  USA  Norway 
  France    Japan   
  Brazil    Italy   
  Urguay   
England and 
Wales   




Table 2: Percentage Decline in Total Commercial Bank Deposits in Various 
Countries, 1929-1932 
Source: League of Nations, Geneva 1934 
Decline of 60-40%  30-20%  20-10%  10-0%  Increase 
Latvia  Venezuela  Estonia  Argentine  Lithuania 
Poland  SA  Netherlands  Italy  Sweden 
Austria  Mexico  Chile  Czechoslovakia  Switzerland 
Bulgaria  Colombia  Canada  Australia  UK 
Germany  Portugal  Norway  Hungary  Brazil 
Romania  Belgium  Ecuador  Denmark  Bolvia 
   Yugoslavia  France  Peru 
 
 
The experience of the banking sector is consistent with the leak performance 
of the overall economy during the Interwar period. In fact the state of the banking 
sector and the serious inefficiencies in capital allocation that we point out resulted 






















































Source: Own Calculations and 
League of Nations, 1934








1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933
Year
TOTAL ASSETS
Source: League of 
Nations, Geneva, 1934 26
 
Table 3: Summary Position at the end of the following years 
(in leva 000,000): Source: League of Nations, Geneva 1934 
Summary Accounts for Commercial Banks  1926  1927  1928  1929  1930  1931  1932  1933 
Number of Banks (branches and sub-branches  110  116  128  135  138  131  129  118 
ASSETS   
cash  597  602  782  714  870  968  884  662 
bills+investmens and securites+participations  1,514  2,110  2,965  3,056  2,293  1,865  1,575  1,262 
loans and dues  2,793  2,880  3,483  3,938  3,489  2,621  2,101  1,992 
sundry assets  287  382  405  511  545  1,133  1,173  1,029 
TOTAL ASSETS  5,349  6,154  7,838  8,442  7,412  6,684  5,861  5,046 
 
LIABILITIES   
Net Profit  99  87  105  118  114  62  30  16 
Deposits, due to banks, other borrowings  4,198  4,983  6,563  6,959  5,887  4,545  3,996  3,347 




Figures 12, 13, 14, and table 3 summarise the experience of Depression. The 
year 1930 was the turning point for the banking system. It marks that peak in 
protested, irrecoverable, loans. It was also the beginning of the gradual erosion of 
bank assets, which by 1933 had dropped to the pre currency stabilisation year of 1926. 
In 1930 began the sharp downward slide of bank profits and rise of net losses. By 
1932 net losses had outstripped profits in the commercial banks balance sheets. The 
rest of the paper explains this drop in profitability and the increase in protested loans 
and eventual losses.  
 
4. European Experience during the Depression: A Theoretical Model 
Economic theory suggests that a sophisticated and efficient financial system is 
highly beneficial to the rest of the economy. A basic function of finance is to mobilise 
aggregate savings and channel them towards investment in productive enterprise
43. 
Schumpeter’s seminal work (1939) has identified the role of financial institution in 
seeking out profitable investment and thus acting as an essential agent in the process 
of creative destruction, which drives economic development in a capitalist economy. 
Asymmetric information problems may arise because investors and entrepreneurs 
                                                 
43 Levine (1997), p.691.  27
have different information about a project.  Entrepreneurs have inside information and 
can estimate the worthiness of a project much better than outside investors, who will 
find it costly to acquire information about the profitability of a project.  More recent 
literature has put forward the function of financial institutions in monitoring firms, in 
terms of their efficient use of the funds provided
44. In this case moral hazard may 
arise as a post-contractual information problem, where entrepreneurs have lower 
incentive of pursuing their project to a profitable end, once they have secured funds 
for their expenses and salaries. Essentially - financial intermediaries are there to solve 
information problems in imperfect investment markets.  
  A second set of theoretical problems is centred on the idea that well-developed 
and open financial markets spread opportunity to a wide section of economic agents, 
while underdeveloped credit markets under strong government influence, are prone to 
restrict access and benefit a select group
45. Firstly, this is detrimental to economic 
growth, as it means that the function of seeking out potentially profitable, but possibly 
risky, projects is severely constrained, and secondly, it is socially harmful as it 
deepens inequality. This literature provides theoretical underpinning of our argument 
that insider lending undermines economic efficiency.   
Insider lending can thus be damaging to the financial system, as it prevents 
prudent regulations of lending to take place – like research of the prospective debtor, 
their financial prospects or real asset ownership, which can compensate the bank in 
case of the latter’s bankruptcy
46. It has been argued that motivation for interlocking 
exists to increase the potential to facilitate relationships between corporations and 
their directors, and has been interpreted in terms of either organizational or class 
dynamics
47. In this paper, it is the inter-organizational perspective that is of interest – 
where corporations create interlocks in response to their needs for resources 
controlled by other organizations in their environment. Particularly attractive partners 
for interlocks are banks, because they control one of the most essential of resources - 
credit.  
                                                 
44 Paulet (1999), p.3, Levine (1993) provides an excellent survey of the theoretical underpinnings and 
the empirical tests that have been conducted on the effects of finance on economic development. More 
recently, Trew (2006) has summarised the findings of the literature on the finance-growth nexus. 
45 Rajan and Zingales,, (1998, 2003). 
46 Soref and Zeitlin (1987), p. 60. 
47 Palmer, Friedland and Singh (1986), p. 783.  28
Avramov (2007) argued that insider lending due to constrained credit was 
widespread in the Interwar Bulgarian banking sector
48. Following in his steps and 
those of La Porta et al. this paper’s second aim is one of testing a hypothesis that the 
practice of insider lending prevented the financial system of playing an active role in 
the process of economic development and proved its demise during the experience of 
the Great Depression.  
Specific models have been developed to estimate banking 
efficiency/profitability and their responses to crises and the Great Depression in 
particular. Calomiris (1993) reports on the changing perceptions of credit allocation 
under asymmetric information in recent times
49. Information costs means that 
‘insiders’ – firm managers and financial intermediaries with a long-term relationship 
with the bank/firm – can supply funds at a lower cost than ‘outsiders’ – relatively 
uninformed stockholders and bondholders
50. Thus changes in the wealth distribution 
between insiders and outsiders can alter the performance of banks. Mishkin (1976) 
followed up by Bernarke (1983) have looked deeper into the problem of debt 
deflation, excessive leverage and allocative consequences of wealth redistribution in 
the presence of capital market imperfections.  They have applied this approach to 
analyse the role of financial factors in the story of the Great Depression in the US.  
In European perspective, Jonker and Van Zanden (1995) have found the 
common explanation of bank failure during the Depression to be falling asset prices 
and default of risky loans
51. Their model is centred on the pattern of deflation to try 
and bring currencies back on par with the levels of 1914.  This eroded the incomes of 
banks by squeezing debtors and reducing asset prices.  The argument runs as follows - 
effectively, the changes that took part in the banking practice during the high 
inflations in the post-1919 world exposed banks to the latter deflations.  
Inflation had positive effects on exporting industries and industries where 
assets increase in value.  The banking sector, however, where most assets were 
nominal, experienced adverse effects.  Banks had to increase their real activities to 
keep up with the rising prices – as their loans to industry decreased in value. Two 
                                                 
48 Avramov (2007), pp. 454-464. 
49  Calomiris (1993). 
50 Akerloff’s 1970 seminal work began research in this area. Followers were Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) 
and Myers and Majluf (1984).  
51  Jonker and Van Zanden (1995).  29
strategies emerged to cope with the inflation periods – to convert nominal assets into 
real ones, in other words the rise in investment banking and the purchase of physical 
assets, or to expand lending rapidly, certainly faster than inflation. Both strategies 
resulted in exposure to the deflation during the Depression years.  
The first strategy directly affected banks liquidity position and the value of 
their balance sheet, once prices of real assets started falling after 1929. Expanding 
lending rapidly meant increased competition between banks for profitable loans and 
as a result the quality of debtors decreased.  In this case the exposure to the deflation 
was indirect, but just as harmful, since bankrupt debtor meant a loss to the bank. Thus 
a rational response to the inflations in the beginning of the 1920s resulted in bank 
vulnerability by the end of the same decade when deflation kicked in.   
Jonker and Van Zanden’s explanation is an appealing one, and it is also 
backed up by compelling empirical evidence. It is aimed at the core of industrialised 
European countries and although putting the blame on ill-conceived loans made 
during an inflationary period, it does not do enough to explain the origins of these 
loans. Particularly for countries where the credit institutions were closely linked to 
industry, it is essential to probe deeper into the origins of these ties and the likelihood 
of them being reasons for widespread bad loans.   
We follow the key assumptions of La Porta et al., to construct an incentive 
structure facing the agents involved
52. The model presented below is an adaptation of 
their simple model of looting developed to explain a study of the Mexican banking 
system. We are focusing on the incentives for insiders to divert cash for their own 
benefit. A key assumption is that insiders structure self-dealing transaction to 
minimise recovery on related-party loans when these default
53.  Related agents can 
avoid repaying their loans at the cost of foregoing their equity in the bank.   
Consequently, related parties repay their bank loans when the value of their equity in 
the bank is higher, but default otherwise
54.  
                                                 
52 La Porta et al. (2002), pp.3-6. 
53 Auditors of the Banking Committee, at the Ministry of Finance, post 1931, often talk about loans 
granted without the appropriate reference to the capacity of the debtor to reply; similarly, loans were 
provided against collateral that was either non-existent or did not cover the value of the loan. For 
instance, see the audit report for Bulgarska Chernomorksa Banka, CSA 602/1/36;  Mackey (1999) 
provides similar evidence for 1990s Mexico.  
54 La Porta et al, (2002), p. 4.  30
Further assumption is that each bank is controlled by a single shareholder who 
owns a fraction α of the cash flows of the bank and a larger fraction β (>α) of the cash 
flows of an industrial firm (the related party), which he or she also controls. We also 
assume that the controlling shareholder has effective control over lending decisions – 
i.e. he can ensure the bank lends to related parties on non-market terms, but needs to 
engage in costly transactions to avoid repayment in the bad state (thus when the bank 
lends L to a related party, the controlling party only receives a fraction φ(L)). The 
model’s dynamics develops over two periods, where loans are be financed by deposits 
(D) and shareholder’s equity (E); (r) is the promised interest on deposits.  In period 1, 
the bank lends L to insiders and E+D-L to unrelated parties (both promise to pay R 
per borrowed dollar). Loans are due in the second period when time ends.  The world 
can be in good state (probability q) or bad state (probability (1-q)). In good state the 
bank recovers all loans, in the bad, only a fraction γ (<R) from unrelated loans.   
Expectedly, loans are unprofitable when made to related parties (Rr=q*R<1) and 
profitable when made to unrelated (Ru=q*R+(1-q)*γ >1).  In equilibrium, insiders do 
not default in the good state.  When α<β, insiders always default.  Below are shown 
the outcomes of lending policy during different states of the world.  
 
(1) good state: α*(R*(E+D)-r*D)≥β*R*L 
 
(2) bad state: α*(γ (E+D-L)+R*L-r*D)< β*R*L 
 
 
(3) value of deposits: D=q*[r*D]+(1-q)*[γ*(E+D-L)] 
 
(4) in the good state the insider receives share of the profits of the bank: 
α*(R*(E+D)-r*D), but looses money on looting: β*R*L; in the bad state the 
insider forgoes equity in the bank, but captures β*φ(L) from looting. 
 
(5) Expected profits of insider are:  
E(π)=q*[α*(R*(E+D)-r*D)+β*(φ(L) -R*L)]+(1 -q) *[β*φ(L)] 
 
(6) From (3) and (5), expected profit can we rewritten as:   31
E(π)=α*[Ru*(E+D-L)+Rr*L-D]+ β*[φ(L)-Rr*L], where Ru(=q*R+(1-q)*γ) and 
Rr(=q*r) denote the expected rates of return on loans to unrelated and related 
parties, respectively.   
 
Thus from (6) the insider picks the level of related lending to maximize her 
expected profits.   
(7)  The first order condition for the incentive to lend to related parties is as follows: 
β*φ = α*(Ru-Rr) + β*Rr 
 
Easily enough, at the margin the cost from engaging in related lending must 
exactly equal its benefit.  Consider the following example: moving 1 unit of local 
currency from unrelated parties to related ones.  The insider is a shareholder in the 
related party and receives β*φ, when the unit is diverted from the bank.  As a 
shareholder in the bank, the insider bears a fraction α of the reduction in profits 
resulting from the change (Ru-Rr).  At the same time the insider pays Rr per borrowed 
unit, as a shareholder of the related firm.  Thus, according to the above equation, 
related lending (or lending through interlocking) is restrained by a high equity stake 
of the insider in the bank and by attractive opportunities to lend to outsiders.  Lending 
to interlocks increases with the insider’s equity stake in the related firm (β) and when 
the opportunity for attractive borrowing terms on interlocked parties exists.   
Furthermore, insider lending becomes attractive when credit is rationed and firms 
meet with difficulties trying to attract outside funds.  This is identical to a situation 
where β>α and the world is in a bad state.  This model is very useful in describing the 
situation in Bulgaria during the interwar period, when industry leaders owned stakes 
in banks, but made most of their profits through non-financial enterprises.  Their 
loyalty was thus to industry and not banks.  
 
5. Econometrics and Robustness Checks 
  This part quantitatively examines the influence of interlocking on bank 
profitability during the depression period.  Our data includes the detailed balances for 
1930 for 101 banks. The table below summarises the data used in our econometric 
model.  32
 
Table 4: Summary of Data on Interlocked Banks 
Banks (N:101, 1930) 
 




Assets (in leva) 
Interlocked Assets 
as Percentage of 
Total (%) 
Bankrupt (N:) 
Total (101)  12,365,118,842  317,709,783  2.6  72 
Sofia banks (33)  10,613,754,531  215,404,426  2.1  - 
Of which Bankrupt (13)  512,486,583  136,121,074  26.5  13 
Countryside Banks (71)  1,751,364,311  102,305,357  5.8  - 
Of which Bankrupt (61)  894,586,101  89,085,409  10.1  61 
Total (101)  12,365,118,842  317,709,783  2.6  72 
With Foreign Share (16)  5,449,915,004  44,354,494  0.8  - 
Of which Bankrupt (5)  110,169,314  44,354,483  40.3  5 
No Foreign Share (85)  6,915,203,838  273,355,289  4.1  - 
Of which Bankrupt (66)  1,296,903,370  180,852,000  14.1  67 
Total (101)  12,365,118,842  317,709,783  2.6  72 
Bankrupt (72)  1,407,072,684  225,206,483  16.1  - 
Survived (29)  10,958,046,158  92,503,300  0.8  - 
 
 
In our model of bank profitability we use a number of well-known measures 
and one variable to represent our hypothesis that insider loans were the underlying 
reason for the failure of the private bank system.  
Return to equity is a measure of profitability used by a number of studies
55.  
Due to lack of data on the dividends paid out by banks a proxy has been used - the 
ratio between profit/loss for 1930 and the capital.  A simple model for bank 
profitability suggests that crucial factors are economies of scale, level of external 
competition and attitude to risk
56. We have included loan quality as a variable, which 
is represented by the ratio of bad loans, or interlocked loans, and total loans as well as 
a possibility for foreign capital share in an institution.  The more insider loans were to 
be found, the weaker the bank is expected to have been.  The opposite must have been 
true regarding foreign share – the more foreign capital was invested in a bank, the 
bigger and more stable a bank is likely to have been.  A baseline model is presented 
below:  
 
ROE= f {LQ, COM, RISK, ES, EI} 
 
                                                 
55 See, Goddard, Molyneux and Wilson, (2004), p. 24; also Okazaki, Sawada and Yokoyama, (2005), 
p.13;  
56 Smirlock (1985, p3), Bourke (1989, p15), Berger (1995, p10) and Goddard et al. (2004, p26).    33
Profitability depends on economies of scale (ES), level of external competition 
(COM), attitude to risk (RISK), loan quality (LQ) and presence of external investor 
(EI).  
Loan quality is controlled by the variable Interlock2, which is a ratio of 
interlocked loans over total loans.  We expect the coefficient on Interlock2 to be 
negative, since insider loans were modelled as having negative influence on bank 
performance and survival chances during an economic crisis. A measure of economies 
of scale is presented as a variable called lnSize – the total assets a bank had in 1930.  
LnSize es expected have a positive effect on bank performance.  External competition 
– Com – is best measured by the number of branches of competing banks in a city or 
town.  In the regression a ranking represents this, where 3 is for largest cities with 
highest competition between largest number of banks and branches and 1 for least 
competition.  Standard oligopoly theory suggests that the more concentrated a market 
is, the higher profits producer can command – in the case of banks, higher interest 
rates can be charged for loans and lower given on deposits.  Com is expected to 
exhibit a negative coefficient.   
Attitude to risk is difficult to measure. We have introduced a number of 
variables to control for it – Levd (leverage) performed best and were used in the final 
regression. It is expected that the coefficients will be positive, yet as with Forgn (see 
below) it is not a clear-cut case.  Higher risk can amount to higher profits, especially, 
more loans provided should bring back higher revenue in terms of interest, but in time 
of economic slowdown, this tendency may be reversed. Presence of external investor, 
usually foreign is controlled by a binary variable, Forgn, which takes the value of 1 
when there was foreign capital in the bank, and 0 otherwise.  Forgn can take a 
positive value if we consider foreign capital to have been a factor boosting stability of 
profitability. This, however, is not entirely clear, because foreign capital pulled out 
during the depression leaving the institutions it used to support exposed to the crisis.  
It is possible too, that banks with foreign capital presence were very conservative in 
their investment decisions, and while a secure strategy - this may not have necessarily 
boosted profitability to any significant level.  It is most like to have only affected the 




Table 5: Description of Variables 
Dependent 
Variable 
ROE 2  ROE: as a measure of profitability; proxied by a ratio of profits over 
set up capital plus reserves (ROE 2); Ideally, ROE should be 
calculated using data from stock returns (dividend over the value of 
stock), however due to data limitations, the ratio of profit over 
capital is used. 
LQ  Interlock2  Percentage of insider loans from total loans; 
ES  LnSize  Size of total assets; used in logarithmic form in the regression 
RISK  Levd  Ratio of deposits over total capital; 
COM 
(competition) 
Dummy for competition, ranked from 1 (least) to 3 (most) 
depending on number of banks/branches in town; 
Dummies 
EI (Forgn)  1 if foreign capital present in the bank, 0 otherwise; 
 
 
The final econometric model for the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression 
is:  
 
ROEi = β0 + β1*(Interlock2) + β2*(lnSize) + β3*(Com) + 
β4*(Forgn) + β5*(Levd) + ε i 
 
 
  Table 6 summarizes basic statistics about the data.  Table 7 follows through 
with the results from the OLS regression on the whole sample, just banks in the Sofia 




Table 6: Descriptive Statistics 
Variables:  Observations  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
ROE 2  101 2.31  21.04  -107.98  22.75 
Interlock2  101 0.21  0.26  0  0.93 
Levd  101 3.43  4.75  0.06  37.01 
Forgn  101 0.16  0.36  0  1 
COM  101 1.90  0.96  1  3 
Ln Size  101 16.75  1.65  13.53  22.18 
 
 
Columns two and three in table 7 show the results of the OLS regression for 
the whole sample.  The coefficient of Interlock2 is negative across all regression and 
significant for regression of the whole sample, the countryside and non-foreign banks. 
The results show that insider lending was not statistically significant for the large 
banks in Sofia region and the one with foreign capital. This is consistent with our 
hypothesis. First – insider lending was pointed to as the underlying reason for 
severely diminished profitability during the depression. Second – our expectation was 
that it was most widespread across small, private, and commercial banks. Third – we  35
pointed out that their auditors better controlled foreign banks and the reason for the 
decline in foreign share in the banking sector was the outward flight of foreign 
capital. All three arguments find support in the econometric analysis.  
The positive and significant coefficients on lnSize across all regressions 
suggest that economies of scale matter. Too much competition was bad news for bank 
profits during the depression, suggested by the highly significant and negative 
coefficient. The risk attitude variable, Levd, is statistically significant. Leveraged 
position caused distress to banks as the economic slowdown began. Foreign capital is 
only significant at the 10% confidence level and only in the regression of the whole 
sample. Size rather than presence of external investor was what mattered for profits of 
large Bulgarian banks.  
 
Table 7: OLS Regression 






Coeff.    t-stat. 
Large Banks 
 
Coeff.    t-stat. 
Small Banks 
 
Coeff.    t-stat. 
Foreign only  
 
Coeff.     t-stat. 
Non - foreign 
 
Coeff.      t-stat. 
LQ 
(Interlock2) 
-25.7         -3.48***  -3.3           -0.28  -30.7       -3.41***  -23.6         -1.02  -19.0         -2.39** 
ES (lnSIZE)  5.0             3.48***  8.6            2.32**  3.7           2.55**  9.73        2.83***  3.0            1.82** 
COM 
(Com) 




-8.8          -0.90  -10.3       -4.48*** 
EI  
(Forgn) 




RISK (Levd)  -9.6           -2.07**  1.8             1.45*  -1.8          -1.82**  -0.4          -0.02  -6.7           -1.43** 
Intercept 
 
-52.2         -2.18**  -140.3       -2.38**  -30.7         -1.21  -155.9      -2.43**  -19.1          -0.71 
R-squared 
 
0.31  0.20  0.24  0.54  0.27 
Adj. R-
squared 
0.28  0.08  0.21  0.38  0.23 
F-test 
 
(5,95) 8.6  (4,28) 1.77  (3,64) 6.92  (4,11) 3.29  (4,80) 7.32 
N: obs 
 
101  33  68  16  85 
(robust st errors used, ***- significant to 1%, ** - significant to 5%, * - significant to 10%) 
  
Some robustness checks on the results above follow:  
The econometric results presented above show strong relationship between 
interlocking and bank profitability, especially in light of possible 
drawbacks/deficiencies in the data.  There are a number of ways to improve the 
exercise.  The results can be checked using alternative measures for interlocking.  
Okazaki et al. measure the number of directors, who had posts in banks and industry  36
and use this to represent interlocking
57.  Their idea can be furthered by gathering data 
on the number of enterprises interlocked to a bank, or the number of interlocks per 
director.  In my case, however, such data will be very difficult and much too long to 
gather, to be of practical use.  The most effective manner of improving the data set is 
to polish the Interlock2 variable by cross referencing data on internal loans.  A more 
extensive look at the available evidence for individual banks can also allow a more in 
depth survey of bank case studies, which would throw significant light on the personal 
relationships. This in turn will help us better distinguish between the theories of 
information asymmetries and pure looting as answers to credit rationing. 
Alternative measures of interlocking were used in successive regressions to 
confirm the robustness of the results.  Using Interlock1 (defined as percentage of 
insider loans from total assets) provided quantitatively very similar results as in table 
7, above. Most problematic were the measurements, constructed to control for attitude 
to risk.  Given the data available from bank balances, we constructed a number of 
variables. Levd was the best performing one in the series of regressions, this why we 
have chosen it for our model. Tables 8 and 9 below show a list of the variables used in 
the robustness checks, their definitions and a summary statistics.  
 
 
                                                 
57 Okazaki et al. (2005,  p20). 
Table 8: Description of all Variables  
(including ones used in the robustness checks) 
ROE 1 
ROE 2 
ROE: as a measure of profitability; proxied by a ratio of profits over 
set up capital plus reserves plus deposits (ROE 1) and profits over 
set up capital plus reserves (ROE 2); Ideally, ROE should be 
calculated using data from stock returns (dividend over the value of 
stock), however due to data limitations, the ratio of profit over 
capital is used. 
Dependent 
Variables 
Interlock1  Percentage of insider loans from total assets;  LQ  




LnSize  Size of total assets; used in logarithmic form in the regression 
LoanDepo  Ratio of total credits to total deposits; 
CapDep  Ratio of total capital (set up capital plus reserves plus profits for 
1930) over deposits; 
Levd  Ratio of deposits over total capital; 
ResDepo  Ratio of reserves over total deposits; 
RISK (Attitude 
to Risk) 
Sec  Ratio of Total Security Holdings (government bonds and debentures 
to the Total Value of Capital + Total Deposits 
COM 
(competition) 
Dummy for competition, ranked from 1 (least) to 3 (most) 
depending on number of banks/branches in town; 
Dummies 
EI (Forgn)  1 if foreign capital present in the bank, 0 otherwise;  37
Table 9: Descriptive Statistics of All Variables  
(including used in Robustness Checks) 
Variables:  Observations  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
Ln Size  101 16.75  1.65  13.53  22.18 
ROE 1  101 0.50  8.31  -56.10  14.00 
ROE 2  101 2.31  21.04  -107.98  22.75 
Interlock1  101 0.14  0.21  0  0.88 
Interlock2  101 0.21  0.26  0  0.93 
CapDepo  101 1.25  2.35  0.03  15.66 
Sec  101 0.06  0.12  0  0.75 
LoanDep  101 1.67  1.81  0  11.85 
ResDepo  101 0.09  0.19  0  1.07 
Forgn  101 0.16  0.36  0  1 
COM  101 1.90  0.96  1  3 
Levd  101 0.64  0.42  0  1.4 




More than 40 years ago Gerschenkron proposed his thesis of economic 
development in relative backwardness, where the state acted as a substitute to 
supposed prerequisites of economic growth
58. Concentrated and mixed banking 
sector, where banks were involved in investment, credit provision and commercial 
practices, is central to such mode of development.  Gerschenkron’s ideas about the 
positive effects of such institutions have been strongly contested, especially on the 
grounds of evidence from the Interwar period.  Late developing economies and their 
universal banking systems, like Germany, Italy and Austria, for different reasons, had 
very difficult time during the depression. Similarly, developing countries in the 
periphery of industrialised Europe experienced widespread bank failures.   
In theory, lending to friendly groups can ensure higher information inflow and 
better opportunities for monitoring ones investment – in other words reducing the risk 
of investment; however, it also means that innovative and possible more profitable 
projects may be left out. A further danger is the consistent and rational channelling of 
funds to insiders’ projects, because they appear to provide most lucrative returns and 
an interlocked agent expects to receive a higher payoff from the enterprise rather than 
his equity in the bank. A formal model of this type of lending, consistent with La 
Porta et al, was used to present it as institutional looting. This hypothesis was 
                                                 
58 Gerschenkron (1962).  38
suggested in addition to Jonkers and Van Zanden’s model of rational madness in 
accumulating bad loans in a hyperinflation-deflation dynamics.  
  To test the theoretical propositions, this paper studies the experience of 
Bulgarian banks during the years of the Great Depression – a peripheral country with 
a developing economy and financial sector. A quantitative exercise, to account for the 
aggregate effects of interlocking on bank performance, was applied on a dataset, 
gathered from previously unused archival material.  
  The econometric results confirm the conclusion the theoretical setting – 
interlocking and insider lending was prevalent in the interwar Bulgarian financial 
system, not only in the small credit institutions of importance to the local economy, 
but also amongst large and well-established banks. More often than not, interlocking 
acted in the direction industry-banks, with a clear aim of leaders of business to use 
their positions in banks to attract as much funding as possible to their own enterprises. 
This had catastrophic effects during the long deflationary period during the 
depression, since both sectors suffered grievous losses.   
  Our model confirms some established views from the literature on bank 
profitability.  Size of banks mattered for their financial success, competition reduced 
profits, while foreign or government backing had positive effects on financial 
stability.  Bad loans given to related parties, however, turned out to be one of the 
major factors in bank ruins during the outset of the depression in the Bulgarian 
economy.  This conclusion runs contrary to Lamoreaux’ major work on insider 
lending during 19
th century east coast US financial structures.
59  Economists and 
economic historians need to consider a two-way effect of strong links between banks 
and industry.  
  Given the prevalence of insider lending as ‘looting’ in the present day 
developing countries, this paper points at two solutions. Low profitability will be 
widespread amongst banks ridden with insider loans, and these will fail during 
economic crises - a case of natural selection
60. Encouraging government regulation to 
deal with the problem can be a second solution. The first suggestion burdens a 
financial system with long-term inefficiency and then a sharp correction during a 
downturn. The second – runs against the policy recommendation of the neoclassical 
                                                 
59 Lamoreaux (1991).  
60 Okazaki et al. (2005).  39
paradigm, yet may prove necessary given the number and scale of financial crises 
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